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Abstract
Local network externalities are present when the utility of buying from a rm not
only depends on the number of other customers (global network externalities), but
also on their identity and / or characteristics. We explore the consequences of local
network externalities within a framework where two rms compete o¤ering di¤eren-
tiated products. We rst show that local network externalities, in contrast to global
network externalities, dont necessarily sharpen competition. Then we show that the
equilibrium allocation is ine¢ cient, in the sense that the allocation of consumers on
rms does not maximize social surplus. Finally we show that local network external-
ities create a di¤erence between the marginal and the average consumer, which gives
rise to ine¢ ciently high usage prices and too high level of compatibility between the
networks.
Key words: Local network externalities, di¤erentiated products, competition,
e¢ ciency
JEL codes: D 43, D 62
1 Introduction
Network externalities are present when a users utility of consumption of a good depends on
the set of other users that are consuming the good. In the economics literature on network
externalities, Rohlfs (1974), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Arthur (1989), Farrell and Saloner
(1985, 1986), and Katz and Shapiro (1992), network externalities are primarily captured by
the unidimensional variable size. In reality the composition of the network may also matter.
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annual meeting, and participants on seminars at UC Berkeley, UC Irvine, University of Oslo, and University
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Consumers may have preferences for the type (or identity) of the consumers in a network
as well as their numbers. This is referred to as local network externalities. The examples of
local network externalities are abound.
The identity of consumers is important in classical network industries, such as telecom-
munication, when service compatibility is imperfect. Some telecommunication rms (partic-
ularly mobile phone operators) set di¤erent on-and o¤ net prices. As a result, consumers
prefer subscribing to the same service as the people with whom they communicate. There
are similar e¤ects in choice between platform providers. It is convenient to use the same
system as colleagues and business partners. In addition, increasing returns to scale in pro-
viding applications imply that the availability of applications for a platform will depend on
the preferences of its adopters and hence customers will tend to choose a platform where the
preferences of the other customers match their own.
Other examples can be found in the nancial service industry, i.e. credit card and other
bank services. In choosing a credit card, the trading habits of the other customers matter
because they inuence vendor acceptance of cards. In banking, direct and indirect trans-
action costs may be lower if trading partners use the same bank. In addition, a banks
customer base is a source of information that can benet customers within the banks area
of specialization Fjeldstad and Sasson (2010).
The examples dont stop with the classical network industries. For consumption goods or
services that involve social interaction, consumers generally have preferences for the identity
of other customers. Obvious examples are clubs and social networking sites. For schools and
universities, other customers (students) form a pool both for social interaction and a basis
for a future professional network. There may be similar e¤ects in employment decisions if
the attractiveness of an employer is a function of the set of current employees.
In the present paper we analyze competition in the presence of local network externalities.
Two rms supply horizontally di¤erentiated products. As in the standard model, agents
have preferences over product varieties, referred to as their technological preference. In
addition they have preferences over the size and composition of the customer base of the
rms. This is modeled by attributing to each consumer a "social location" on a circle,
and letting consumers have a preference for using the same service as consumers to whom
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they are closely located on the circle. Finally, social location and technological preferences
are assumed to be (imperfectly) correlated. In the case of services that facilitate customer
exchange, correlated preferences may relate to mode of exchange. With respect to platforms,
users that are socially close may have similar technological needs.
Our paper makes four contributions to the literature on network externalities. The rst
is methodological. We propose a model of competition with local network externalities, and
show that if the social preferences are not too strong relative to the technological preferences,
then the model has a unique equilibrium. We characterize this equilibrium and show how it
depends on the fundamental parameters of the model, the nature of the network externalities,
and the relative strength of the technological versus social preferences.
Our second contribution regards the e¤ects of network externalities on competition inten-
sity. It is a celebrated result that network externalities may sti¤en competition between rms
(Gilbert 1992, Farrell and Saloner 1992, Foros and Hansen 2001, La¤ont et al. 1998, Shy
2001), as network externalities increase the elasticity of the demand function. Surprisingly,
we nd that with local network externalities this e¤ect may be weakened or even eliminated,
even if the marginal consumers highly value an increase in the network size. The reason is
that after a price change, the previously marginal consumer is inframarginal and the new
marginal consumer has di¤erent social preferences.
Third, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of the model and show that the equilibrium is not
socially optimal. Compared with the planners solution, consumers put too much emphasis
on their technological preferences and too little emphasis on their social preferences.
Finally, we show that local network externalities create systematic di¤erences between
the average and the marginal consumers. In expected terms, the inframarginal consumer
has shorter social distance to the average consumer in the network than has the marginal
consumer. We show that if rms o¤er two-part tari¤s for connection and usage, then
they will set usage price above marginal costs in order to extract rent from the inframarginal
consumers. When investing in enhanced one-way compatibility, rms will overinvest, because
the marginal agent will have stronger social ties to the customers in the other network than
has the average customer.
There is empirical evidence that local network externalities are important. Birke and
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Swann (2005) study individual consumerschoice of mobile operators in the U.K. They nd
that individual choices are heavily inuenced by the choices of others in the same household.
Tucker (2008) analyzes the introduction of a video-messaging technology in an investment
bank. She nds that adoption by either managers or workers in boundary spanner positions
has a large impact on the adoption decisions of employees who wish to communicate with
them. Adoption by ordinary workers has a negligible impact. Corrocher and Zirulia (2009)
survey Italian studentschoice of mobile operator and nd that local network e¤ects (the
choice made by friends and family members) play an important role, although the strength
of the e¤ects is heterogeneous.
Some of the seminal contributors on network externalities were aware that network exter-
nalities need not be spillovers. Rolphs (1974) pointed out that there may be "communities of
interest groups" where the members care mostly about the behavior of the other members in
the group. Farrel and Klemperer (2007) note that "A more general formulation (of network
externalities) would allow each user i to gain more from the presence of one other user j than
of another k", and refers to this as local network externalities without pursuing it further.
Swann (2002) assumes that di¤erent groups di¤er in di¤usion rates and communication pat-
terns, and on this basis show that network e¤ects hardly will be linear in the size of the
network.
Banerji and Dutta (2009) analyze an adoption model where the agents form groups, and
the members of each group communicate more with the other members of the group than
with members of other groups. Firms compete in prices and o¤er identical products, and
there is an equilibrium where the market is segmented. If one rm reduces prices marginally
below the other, it may not attract a group as the members are not able to coordinate their
decisions. Hence the market is segmented. Sundararajan (2007) analyzes consumersdecision
to adopt a network when network externalities are local and the agents have incomplete
information about the structure and strength of adoption complementarities. Galeotti and
Goyal (2009) study optimal strategies for inuencing the behavior of a group of people who
are socially connected, and how this depends on the dispersion of social connections. Finally,
our paper is tangent to a literature on coordination and formation of, as well as exchange
in networks, of people, see Kranton and Minehart (2001) and Bala and Goyal (2000), and
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Ballester et al (2006).
In contrast with the contributions cited above, we assume that although network exter-
nalities are local, the number of connections of each person is large (innite), so that the
law of large number applies. Our assumptions better reect sociological accounts of net-
works showing that people and rms maintain a combination of a limited number of strong,
often clustered, ties with closely associated others and a much larger number of weak ties
(Granovetter 2004).
In addition, we introduce su¢ ciently strong regularity conditions on the model so that we
obtain a unique equilibrium, with a structure that is similar to the structure in models with
spillovers network externalities. Hence our model may bridge a gap between the literature
on adoption in small networks and the literature on competition with spillovers network
externalities.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In the next section we formalize local network
externalities, and set up the competitive framework. We dene equilibrium and show exis-
tence and uniqueness in section 3, and in section 4 we study how local and spillovers network
externalities inuence competition intensity. We then move on to analyzing the welfare prop-
erties of the model in section 5. In section 6 we study how consumer heterogeneities that
endogenously arise with local network externalities may inuence pricing decisions, while
section 7 concludes. Proof are relegated to the appendix.
2 Modeling local network externalities
We analyze competition between two networks, supplied by rm A and rm B.
The innovation in this paper is our modeling of consumer preferences, which have two
parts. First, the consumerssocial preferences are represented by a Salop circle, with circum-
ference equal to two.1 Each consumer has a social location (or just location) on this circle.
Denote by zi 2 
 agent is social location, where 
 = [ 1; 1]. We refer to the location z = 0
as the north pole and jzj = 1 as the south pole. Finally, let d denote a distance measure on
1The motivation behind letting agents be distributed on the circle is to avoid the asymmetry associated
with consumers on the end of a line that only communicate in one direction.
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, dened as
d(zi; zj) = min[jzi   zjj; 2  jzi   zjj]
Thus d(zi; zj) is the shortest distance between the two agents along the circle.
Let us give some examples. If the application at hand relates to membership in clubs,
social location reects status and foci. If it relates to the choice of platform, e.g. Apple or
Windows based computers, the social location will be inuenced by occupation and educa-
tion. If the application at hand relates to banking, social location may reect industry and
business niche, while in mobile telephony it may be related to friends and family.
The second step regards the utility obtained by interaction with peers choosing the same
supplier. The function g : [0; 1] ! R+ shows agent is preference for being in the same
network as an agent at social distance d. We assume that g is strictly decreasing in d,
reecting that agents gain more from "being together" with people that are socially close
than socially distant.
Suppose a fraction H(z) of the agents of social location z belongs to network A (or,
alternatively, the probability that a person located at z chooses the A-network).2 We assume
that the value of interaction is additive, in the following sense: Then the social utility of
joining rm A and B for a person of location zi, denoted by gA(zi) and gB(zi), respectively,
can be written as
gA(zi) 
Z


g(d(z; zi))H(z)dz
gB(zi) 
Z


g(d(z; zi)) [1 H(z)] dz:
We refer to this as the network utility of an individual associated with joining rm A and
rm B, respectively. For notational simplicity, the subscript 
 is dropped in all integrals
from now on. Finally, dene g as
g 
Z
g(d(z; zi))dz = gA(zi) + gB(zi) (1)
Note that g denotes the maximum network utility a consumer can get, the same for all
agents, obtained if all agents in the economy is with the same supplier.
2At this point our model allows for two di¤erent interpretations. Either there may be one person located
at each z, in which case H(z) is a probability. Or it may be a continuum of agents with measure 1 at each
z, in which case H(z) is a fraction. We will use the two interpretations interchangeably.
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We do not allow g to be negative. Hence there is no crowding-out e¤ects of membership.
This seems to be a reasonable assumption for platforms, banks, and telephony, but maybe
less so for social clubs, where the average member "type" may matter. Note also that this
additivity property gives rise to increasing return to scale on the demand side, and thus
brings in an element of spillovers network externalities.3
The two rivaling suppliers A and B o¤er horizontally di¤erentiated products. We model
technological preferences by the Hotelling line, where the suppliers are located at the end
points of a line of unit length, while the consumers are located between them. Technological
di¤erences may reect pure technological features, user-friendliness, and design. Apple and
Microsoft have chosen di¤erent solutions, as have Playstation and X-box. Di¤erent mobile
phone operators also o¤er services with di¤erent features that appeal to di¤erent segments
of the market. Finally, schools may o¤er di¤erent curricula and students may di¤er in their
preference for these.
A driving assumption in our analysis is that social and technical preferences may be
related. We assume that people who are socially close are more likely to share the same
technological preferences. For instance, when choosing between Apple and Windows-based
computers, the technological solutions of the respective platforms may be better suited for
some professional tasks than others, and thus be preferable by members of certain profes-
sions. People that one would prefer to co-a¢ liate with may have similar interests as oneself
regarding curriculum (schools), activities (clubs), and calling plans (e.g. di¤erent relative
pricing of messaging and voice in mobile phone services). More specically, let y denote the
location of a consumer on the technology line, with rm A located at y = 0 and rm B at
y = 1. Consider a consumer who has social location at zi. We assume that this consumers
location in technology space is stochastic and drawn from a distribution given by
yi = ajzij+ (1  a)" (2)
Here " is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0; 1], i.i.d. for all agents, and the parameter
a satises 0  a  1 . If a = 0 then y and z are independent. If a = 1, then the two variables
3We will sometimes refer to g as the total number (measure) of "friends" that an individual has, with
the value of being in the same network as a friend normalized to 1. With this interpretation, g(d) may be
interpreted as the probability density that a person has a friend (or the number of friends) at distance d.
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are perfectly correlated.
The expected technological preference (conditional on z) can be written as
Eyjz = ajzj+ (1  a)=2
Thus Eyj0 = (1   a)=2 and Eyj1 = (1 + a)=2, while Eyj1=2 = 1=2. Note the symmetry
around 1=2. The cumulative distribution function of y conditional on z , F (yjz) can be
written as
F (yjz) = 0 if y < ajzj
=
y   ajzj
1  a if ajzj  y  ajzj+ 1  a
= 1 if y > ajzj+ 1  a (3)
Or, more compactly,
F (yjz)  max

min

y   ajzj
1  a ; 1

; 0

The distribution is illustrated in the following gure;
0 1z
y
1
1-a
a
zi
E(y|z
)
y-a|z|
1-a
y
The support of the conditional distribution yjz is indicated by the shaded area.
Let F (y) =
R 1
0
F (yjz)dz denote the unconditional distribution of y, and f(y) the associ-
ated density. The conditional density f(yjz) is 1=(1  a) if ajzj  y  ajzj+ 1  a and zero
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otherwise, hence the unconditional density at y = 1=2 is4
f(1=2) =
1
1  a if a  1=2 (4)
f(1=2) =
1
a
if a  1=2 (5)
The uncontingent distribution of y is thus only uniform in the special cases with a = 0 or
a = 1. As will be clear below, this is not important for our analysis.
The utility of an agent with characteristics (yi; zi) by joining network A at price pA, and
network B at price pB, is given by
uA(yi; zi) =   tyi + gA(zi)  pA (6)
uB(yi; zi) =   t(1  yi) + gB(zi)  pB (7)
The parameter t reects the intensity of technological preferences, below referred to as the
"transportation cost" per unit of technological distance, while  denote the intrinsic value
of being connected to a platform. In what follows we assume that  is su¢ ciently big so
that the entire market is covered. We require that t(1  a) > g (see below).
The timing of the model goes as follows:
1. The two rms A and B simultaneously and independently choose prices pA and pB,
respectively. The rms are not able to price discriminate by setting di¤erent prices for
agents with di¤erent locations at the circle.
2. The agents independently decide which rm to go to, given the prices and given their
expectations about the choice of the other agents in the economy. In equilibrium,
expectations are rational.
As a benchmark case, we derive the equilibrium of the model with pure global network
externalities, i.e., where g(d) is independent of d. More specically, g() = g=2 8, in
4To see this, note that
f(1=2) = f(1=2jz) Pr[ajzj  1
2
 ajzj+ 1  a]
which after some manipulation gives the equation.
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which case
R
g(d(z; zi))dz =
R
g=2dz = g. Let ym denote the technological preference of a
consumer that is indi¤erent between the two networks (independent of z). It follows that
uA(yi) =   tyi + gF (ym)  pA
uB(yi) =   t(1  yi) + g(1 F (ym))  pB
Hence
ym =
1
2
+
pB   pA
2t
+
g(2F (ym)  1)
2t
(8)
Taking the derivative with respect to pA gives
dym
dpA
=   1
2(t  gf(ym))
Suppose the rms have equal costs c. Firm A maximizes A = (pA   c)F (ym), with rst
order condition F (ym)   (pA   c)f(ym)dymdpA = 0. For rm B, the rst order condition reads
(1 F (ym))  (pB   c)f(ym)dymdpA = 0. In the symmetric equilibrium with ym = F (ym) = 1=2
it follows that5
pA = pB = c+
t
f(1=2)
  g
Thus, from (4) and (5),
pA = c+ ta  g if a  1=2 (9)
pA = c+ t(1  a)  g if a  1=2: (10)
We have thus reiterated the well-known result that global network externalities reduce equi-
librium prices in a symmetric equilibrium. The point is that global network externalities
make demand more price sensitive: A reduction in price brings in new agents. This makes
the network even more attractive, and even more agents are attracted to the network, and
it is the existence of transportation costs that keep demand from exploding.
5From the rst order condition for pA and symmetry it follows that
pA = c+
1
2
[f(
1
2
)
dym
dpA
] 1 = c+
t
f( 12 )
  g
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3 Equilibrium
In this section we derive the equilibrium of the model with local network externalities, that
is, when g() is a strictly decreasing function of  at some intervals. We rst solve the second
stage of the game, which we refer to as the assignment game. Then we solve for the optimal
prices given the equilibrium of the assignment game.
3.1 The assignment game
In this section we focus on the agents choice of network for given prices pA and pB. The cost
to a rm of handling a customer is cj; j = A;B.
The attractiveness of a given network depends both on how many other agents that chose
the network, and on their social location. Let H0(z) denote the fraction of the agents located
at z 2 [ 1; 1] that are customers of rm A. For any zi at which there is an indi¤erent agent,
let ym(zi) denote the technological preference of that agent. Note that ym depends on zi,
since the social position of the agent inuences the distribution of the agents friends on the
two networks. From (6) and (7) it follows that
uA(ym(zi); zi) = u
B(ym(zi); zi)
()
ym(zi) =
pB   pA + gA(zi)  gB(zi) + t
2t
(11)
Let H1(z) denote the fraction of agents at social localization z that prefers the A-network
given H0, and write H1(z) =  H0(z). In order to characterize   we use that H1(z) =
F (ym(z)jz). From (3) it thus follows that
 H(zi) = 0 if ym(zi) < ajzij (12)
=
ym(zi)  ajzij
1  a if ajzij  y  ajzij+ 1  a
= 1 if ym(zi) > ajzij+ 1  a
Or, more compactly,
H1(zi) =  H0(zi) = max

min

ym(zi)  ajzij
1  a ; 1

; 0

(13)
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Since (6) and (7) are continuous in y, it follows that ym(zi) and thus H1(zi) are continuous.
From (11) and the denitions of gA(zi), gB(zi) and g it follows that
ym(zi) =
R
g(d(z; zi))H0(z)dz +
pB pA g+t
2
t
Inserted into (13) this gives
 H0(zi) = max
"
min
"R
g(d(z; zi))H0(z)dz +
pB pA g+t
2
  tajzij
t(1  a) ; 1
#
; 0
#
(14)
For given prices pA and pB, an equilibrium distribution function He(z) is a xed-point sat-
isfying
He(z) =  He(z)
Proposition 1 Suppose g < t(1 a). Then   is a contraction mapping with modulus g
t(1 a) .
Hence, for any given prices pA and pB, the xed point H(z) =  H(z) exists and is unique.
Thus, whenever g < t(1   a), the coordination game between the agents has a unique
solution. In order to understand the result, note that the assumption on parameter values
implies that the technology preferences are strong compared with the network e¤ect. Assume
for the moment that H(z) < 1 for all z and suppose as an example that all types increase
their threshold value ym(z) with  units. This increases H with =(1   a) units. The
increased utility of joining network H due to network externalities is thus g=(1  a). The
increase in transportation cost for the marginal agent however is t, which is greater than
g=(1  a) by assumption.
As a result, self-fullling prophesies is not an issue in this model: an increase in the
number of agents going to one network increases the attractiveness of the network, but not
su¢ ciently much to compensate for the increased transportation costs for the new agents.
Given proposition 1, we can easily show that He(z) has the following properties:
Lemma 1 The equilibrium function He(z) has the following properties
i) He(z) is symmetric around z = 0; He(z) = He( z): If pA = pB then He(z) =
1 He(1  z), 0  z  1=2 (with the analogous property for z < 0).
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ii) For all values of z where 0 < He(z) < 1, He(z) is strictly decreasing in z for z > 0 and
strictly increasing in z for z < 0 (except in the special case where He(z) = 0:5 everywhere,
see below).
iii) H can be written as a function of pB   pA and is increasing in pB   pA for all z
iv) With pA = pB, the following holds:
a) An increase in g or a decrease in t increases He(z) for jzj < 1=2, and the decrease
is strict if He(z) < 1. The opposite holds for jzj > 1=2.
b) An increase in a (a reduction in 1   a) increases He(z) for jzj < 1=2, and the
increase is strict if He(z) < 1. The opposite holds for jzj > 1=2:
It is possible to show that for the case with pA = pB, H(z) is concave on z 2 ( 1=2; 1=2)
and convex on the complementary interval (the proof is available upon request).
3.2 Equilibrium prices
In this section we derive the equilibrium prices pA and pB. Let NA and NB denote the total
number of agents in network A and B, respectively. Then
NA(pB   pA) =
Z
H(z; pB   pA)dz
NB(pB   pA) =
Z
[1 H(z; pB   pA)] dz = 2 NA(pB   pA)
The prot of rm A and B can be written
A = (pA   cA)NA(pB   pA)
B = (pB   cB) [2 NA(pB   pA)]
with rst order conditions
NA(pB   pA)  (pA   cA)N 0A(pB   pA) = 0 (15)
2 NA(pB   pA)  (pB   cB)N 0A(pB   pA) = 0 (16)
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With identical costs, the unique solution to the two equations is given by6
pA = pB = c+
1
N 0A(0)
(17)
The second order condition for rm A reads
 2(pB   pA)N 0A(pB   pA) + (pA   cA)N 00A(pB   pA) < 0 (18)
The second order condition for rm B is dened analogously. Due to symmetry, NA() is odd,
and thus has an inection point at zero. Hence N 00A(0) = 0, and the second order conditions
are satised locally.
4 Characterizing equilibrium
In what follows we want to characterize the equilibrium in some detail. To simplify the
exposition we assume that cA = cB = c in which case the equilibrium is symmetric. In
general, it is hard to characterize equilibrium. However, for some sets of parameters the
equilibrium take particularly simple forms. We refer to these as open and closed equilibria.
4.1 Open equilibrium
We say that the equilibrium is open if 0 < He(z) < 1 for all z, in which case there are
marginal agents for all locations z.
0 ½ 1
Network B
Network A
zz
H(z)
6To show uniqueness, note that it follows from (15) and (16) that pA cpB c =
NA(pB pA)
2 NA(pB pA) . If pA > pB , the
left hand side exceeds one whereas the right hand side is strictly below one, a contradiction.
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Consider an agent located at z = 0 with the largest technological preference for the B-
network relative to the A-network, obtained for " = 1 (see equation 2). This agent prefers
the B-network if
gA(0)  t(1  a) < gB(0)  ta
or
gA(0)  gB(0) < t(1  2a)
As gA(0) > gB(0), a necessary condition for open equilibrium is that this person has a
technological preference for the B-network, i.e. that 1  2a > 0 or
a < 1=2
A su¢ cient condition is that
g < t(1  2a)
The left-hand side is an upper bound on the social gain of being in the A-network rather
than the B network. The condition requires that the maximum technological preference for
the B-network (the right-hand side) outweighs this upper bound on the social gain from
being in the A-network. Clearly this ensures He(0) < 1, and hence that H(z) < 0 for all z.
An open equilibrium is more likely if g is close to the uniform distribution on [0; 1], in
the sense that a bigger set of other parameter values will lead to an open equilibrium (social
location does not matter for interaction). It is trivial to show that if g uniform on [0; 1]
(global network externalities) the equilibrium is open whenever a < 1=2.
Lemma 2 Suppose 0 < He(z) < 1 for all z. Then
N 0A() =  
1
t(1  a)  g (19)
Inserted into (17) this immediately gives us our next proposition:
Proposition 2 In an open equilibrium, prices are given by (with topscript O indicating open
equilibrium)
pOA = p
O
B = c+ t(1  a)  g (20)
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If we compare (20) and (10) (since a < 1=2) we see that they are identical. The existence
of network externalities increases competition and decreases prices. Furthermore, the shape
of g does not inuence network pricing, only g. Thus, in the open equilibrium, only the
global properties of the network externalities, measured by g; inuences prices. The network
structure, dened by the shape of g,plays no role.
4.2 Closed equilibrium
If the equilibrium is open, all the agents in the economy inuence each other through friends
of friends e¤ects, in the following sense: Suppose H(z) shifts up on an interval around an
arbitrary zi. This will make it more attractive to enter the A network for all the agents who
have friends on this interval. This again makes it more attractive to join the A network
for agents who have friends who have friends on the interval, and so on. In the end H(z)
increases for all z.
However, if H = 1 (0) on su¢ ciently large intervals around the north (south) pole, this
chain may be broken. To be more specic, let z1 denote the highest value of z such that
H(z1) = 1, hence H(z) = 1 on the interval [ z1; z1]. Dene z0 > 0 to be the smallest value
such that g(z0) = 0. It follows that if z0 < 2z1, an increase in H(zi) for zi > z1 will not
increase H for negative values of z, i.e., changes in H in the western hemisphere do not
inuence the value of H in the eastern hemisphere. In this case we say that the equilibrium
is closed.
0 ½ 1
Network B
Network A H(z)
z1 1-z1-z1
z0
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Note that z0 is exogenously determined by the shape of g. For the equilibrium to be
closed, the agent located at z0
2
with the largest technological preference for the B-network
relative to the A-network, must strictly prefer the A-network.
gA(
z0
2
)  t
h
1  a+ az0
2
)
i
> gB(
z0
2
)  t
h
1  (1  a)  az0
2
i
or
gA(
z0
2
)  gB(z0
2
) > t
h
1  2a(1  z0
2
)
i
The left-hand side of the equation is positive, hence a su¢ cient the equilibrium to be closed
is that 1   2a(1   z0
2
) < 0. The latter can be rewritten as az0=2 + (1   a)  1=2. Note
that this condition can only be true if a > 1=2, and it is always satised if a is su¢ ciently
large. Furthermore, as g! 0, a necessary condition for the equilibrium to be closed is that
a > 1=2.
When the equilibrium is closed, the equilibrium distribution H has some remarkable
properties. Denep := pB pA, letHp(z) denote the equilibrium distribution of customers
given p (hence H0 = He denotes the distribution when p = 0).
Lemma 3 Suppose the equilibrium is closed.. Let  = p
2ta
, and let p be su¢ ciently small
so that z1 >
z0+jj
2
. Then the following holds
a) For z > 0, then Hp(zi) = H0(zi   ).
b) For z < 0, then Hp(zi) = H0(zi + )
c) The derivative of NA(p) at p = 0 gives
N 0A(0) =  
1
ta
(21)
This is possible also for zi <  since by assumption H(z) = 1 on [ ; ]. The analogous
result holds for p < 0.
By inserting (21) into (17) it follows that (with topscript C indicating that the equilibrium
is closed):
Proposition 3 Suppose the equilibrium is closed. Then
pCA = p
C
B = c+ at (22)
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If we compare (22) and prices without network e¤ects (9) with a  1=2, we see that
prices are identical to a situations without network externalities (with g = 0). When the
equilibrium is closed, network externalities do not inuence prices! Hence in this regime,
neither the size of the global network e¤ect g nor the underlying structure matters for pricing
decisions.
To gain intuition for the proposition, rst note that global network externalities tend to
increase price competition, because they increase the price elasticity of demand. Reducing
the price then increases the size of the network, and this will make the network even more
attractive. This mechanism does not hold in the closed equilibrium. A reduction in price
will increase the network size, and this increases the social value of the network for the
agents that previously were marginal. However, these agents are now inframarginal. The
now marginal customers do not have more friends in the network than the previous marginal
customers.
To be more precise, note that from lemma (3), a decrease in say pA shifts the H(z)
function to the right with  units. Hence the marginal customer at z +  obtains exactly
the same social utility as did the previously marginal consumer at z before the shift. Hence,
the multiplier e¤ect associated with global network externalities is defused. This is possible
as long as none of the agents communicate with people on the "opposite" side of the polar
points (z = 0 or jzj = 1).
4.3 Hybrid equilibrium
A hybrid equilibrium is an equilibrium that is neither open nor closed. i.e., when H(z) = 1
for jzj close to the polar points while H(z0) < 1. Hybrid equilibria may exist for a wide range
of parameter values. A su¢ cient condition for the existence of hybrid competition is that
a > 1=2 (which rules out an open equilibria) and z0  1 (which rules out closed equilibria).
The pricing formulas (20) and (22) give a lower and upper bound on prices in equilibria with
hybrid competition.
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5 E¢ ciency
In this section we analyze the e¢ ciency properties of equilibrium, independently of which of
the classes (open, closed or hybrid) it belongs to. First we derive the optimal distribution of
agents over networks, and refer to this as composition e¢ ciency. Recall that gA(zi) denotes
the social value of an agent at zi of joining network A: At any given social location zi, a
fraction H(zi) of the agents join network A, hence the total social value created in network
A, VA, is
VA =
Z
gA(zi)H(zi)dzi
Analogously, denote the total social value created in network B by VB . Then
VB =
Z
gB(zi)(1 H(zi))dzi
In the appendix we characterize the allocations of agents on networks that give the highest
and the lowest total social value, given that the two networks are equally large. The total
social value is minimized if H(z) = 0:5 for all z, in which case each agent can communicate
with exactly half of her friends. The social value is maximized if H(z) equals 1 on an interval
with measure 1, and is zero on the complementary interval. However, the allocation that
maximizes total social value implies that some of the agents are allocated to a network with a
technology they disfavor. Hence there is a trade-o¤ between the social benets of increasing
the number of connections and costs associated with not allocating consumers according to
technological preferences.
For a given distribution H(z) let T (z) denote aggregate transportation cost for agents
located at z. Recall that the technological preference of the marginal consumer is given by
(from 2)
ym(z) = ajzj+ (1  a)H(z):
(By denition this is also the technology preference for the marginal customer in rm B). It
follows that
T (z) =
ym(z)Z
0
tyf(yjz)dy +
1Z
ym(z)
t(1  y)f(yjz)dy
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Taking derivatives with respect to H(zi) 2 (0; 1), and utilizing that f(yjz) = 1=(1 a) (from
3), gives
dT (zi)
dH(zi)
= 2t[ym(z)  1
2
]
Finally, aggregate transportation costs are given by T =
R
T (z)dz
A composition e¢ cient distribution, denoted by H(z) maximizes social welfare dened
as
W = VA + VB  T
=
Z
[gA(zi)H(zi) + gB(zi)(1 H(zi))  T (z)]dz (23)
We want to maximizeW point-wise. In the appendix we show that with an interior solution,
this rst order condition can be written as
H(zi) =
R
g(d(z; zi))H
(z)dz +
t
2
 g
2
  t
2
ajzij
t
2
(1  a)
If the right-hand side exceeds 1, then H(zi) = 1. If the right-hand side is below 0, then
H(zi) = 0. Thus H(z) is a xed-point to the mapping  g given by
 gH(zi) = max
"
min
"R
g(d(z; zi))H
(z)dz +
t
2
 g
2
  t
2
ajzij
t
2
(1  a) ; 1
#
; 0
#
(24)
If we compare (14) and (24) for pA = pB we see that the only di¤erence between   and  g
is that t in   is replaced with t=2 in  g. Hence the following proposition is immediate
Proposition 4 The equilibrium distribution is not composition e¢ cient. The social e¢ cient
composition prole H() is steeper than the equilibrium prole H(). Thus, for jzj < 1=2 it
follows that H(z)  H(z) with strict inequality whenever H(z) < 1. The opposite is true
for jzj > 1=2.
The result follows from Lemma 1 iv b) and the fact that the planners solution is equiv-
alent with the market solution with t replaced by t=2:
The e¢ ciency result is intuitive. The consumers, when choosing between suppliers, trade
o¤ transportation cost and social gains. However, the social gain is matched by an equally
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large externality on the other agents in the network. The transportation cost, by contrast,
is carried by the agent in its entirety. As a result, the planner puts twice as much weight
on social value relative to transportation cost as the market, or equivalently half as much
weight on transportation costs.
For jzij < 1=2, He(zi) > 1=2. Thus, the agent located at zi obtains more social value
by joining the A-network than the B-network. For the same reason, the positive externality
of joining the A-network is larger than the positive externality associated with joining the
B network, and it follows that H(zi) > He(zi) on the entire northern hemisphere. The
opposite holds on the southern hemisphere
Put di¤erently, the net externalities associated with increasing H(z) at z = zi in the
market solution He(z) is gA(zi)   gB(zi) where gA(zi) and gB(zi) are evaluated for the
equilibrium distributionHe. Again observe that the net externality is positive if the marginal
agent at zi has a majority of friends in the A-network. An agent at the northern hemisphere
has more friends connected to the A-network than the B-network. Hence if she chooses rm
A, the net externality is positive. Thus, compared to rst best composition e¢ ciency, too
many agents at the northern hemisphere choose network B, and too many agents at the
southern hemisphere choose network A. The welfare maximizing distribution H(z) is thus
steeper than the equilibrium distribution He(z).
6 Endogenous agent heterogeneity
Di¤erences in preferences between marginal and average agents may give rise to distortions.
This was rst explored in Spences (1975) model of a monopolists choice of quality. If
marginal and average consumers value quality di¤erently, the quality level chosen by the
monopolist will not be socially optimal.
Local network externalities, in contrast with global externalities, give rise to a di¤erence
between the marginal and the average agents in a network, as the former in average obtains
less utility from interacting than the latter. This is true both in the closed, open and hybrid
equilibrium. In slightly extended versions of the model this may lead to new distortions,
which come in addition to and may exacerbate the composition ine¢ ciencies analyzed above.
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6.1 Communication intensity
In this subsection we assume that consumers, when connected to a network, choose how
much to use it. This is clearly an important aspect in communication platforms, which we
use as our example. However, it is also relevant for clubs (where agents choose how much to
use it) and platforms like game consoles (where the agents choose how many applications to
buy).
We assume that the utility a consumer obtains from communication within a relationship
is endogenous and given by !(x), where x is usage. We let gA(zi) and gA(zi) denote the
number of friends (or connections) in the A and the B network, respectively, for a person
located at zi. For simplicity, we assume that only communication paid by the agent gives
rise to utility.7 Finally, an agent can only communicate with the agents in the same network.
Compatibility is discussed in the next section.
Firms compete by o¤ering two-part tari¤s (pj; qj), j = A;B, where q is the cost of using
the network and p is a xed fee. The net surplus v(qA) per friend for a consumer in network
A is
v(qA) =Max
x
[!(x)  qAx]
We write the optimal usage as a function of qA, x(qA). Note that x(qA)   v0(qA).
The timing of the game is exactly as before, the only di¤erence is that rms now advertise
a pair (pj; qj). The utility for a agent (zj; yj) of joining the A network is
uA(yi; zi) =   tyi + v(qA)gA(zi)  pA (25)
and similarly, the utility of joining the B network is
uB(yi; zi) =   t(1  yi) + v(qB)gB(zi)  pB (26)
The expressions are identical with the corresponding expressions for uA and uB in (6) and
(7) except for the multiplicative terms v(qA) and v(qB). By doing exactly the same exercise
as above when deriving (14), it follows that for given prices, the equilibrium distribution
Hx(z) is the xed point to the mapping  x given by
7Note that the social externality identied in the previous section is still present: If a person joins a
network, her "friends" in that network obtains utility from having one more person to communicate with.
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 xH(zi) = max
"
min
"
v(qA)+v(qB)
2
R
g(d(z; zi))H(z)dz +
pB pA v(qB)g+t
2
  tajzij
t(1  a) ; 1
#
; 0
#
(27)
Note that for given qA and qB, v(qA) and v(qB) are constants, hence we can show existence
and uniqueness of the xed point in exactly the same way as above.
Dene GA 
R
gA(zi)H(zi)dzi as the total number of connections or friends in the net-
work.8 The prot of rm A is given by
A = (pA   c)NA + (qA   cx)x(qA)GA (28)
It follows that x(qA)GA shows aggregate usage of the network, while (qA cx) is the mark-up
per unit of usage. Note that the rm not only care about the size of its network, but also
its composition (the social location of its customers), as this inuences GA.
We only consider symmetric equilibria. Since optimization with respect to pA corresponds
to the simpler case above, we focus on the choice of usage price qA. In the appendix we derive
the optimal qA, given the constraint that pA is adjusted in such a way that the market share
of rm 1 stays constant at 1=2. The rst order condition for qA can be written as
[1  ]x(qA) + (qA   cx)x0(qA) + x(qA)(qA   cx)elqGA
qA
= 0 (29)
where
 :=
g=2
GA
and elqG is the elasticity operator. The variable  shows number of friends that the marginal
customers have in the network relative to the number of friends the average customer has
in the network. To see this, rst note that in the symmetric equilibrium, the agent located
at z = 1=2 has half of its friends in both networks. Marginal customers north of equator
have more, and south of equator less than half of their friends in the A network. Due to
symmetry, it follows that in average the marginal consumers have exactly g=2 friends in the
A-network. The denominator shows the total number of "friends" in the network. Since
each network in the symmetric equilibrium obtains a measure of 1 customers (the measure
8Each pair of friends counts as two friends, as person i is friend with person j and person j is friend with
person i.
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of consumers in the economy is 2) this is also the average number of friends per customer in
the network. With pure global network externalities  = 1, in all other cases  2 (1=2; 1).
The rst term in (29) thus represents rent extraction from the inframarginal types. Since
inframarginal customers on average have higher communication intensity than the marginal
customers, increasing the usage price increases total payments from existing customers, even
though the xed price pA is reduced so that the market share of the rm stays constant.
The second term in (29) is self-explanatory. The last term shows the change in incomes
from usage fees caused by changes in the composition of the network. In the appendix we
show that elqGA < 0: A higher usage price hurts the marginal agents with many friends in
the network (z low) more than those with a few friends in their network (z high). A higher
qA thus implies that H becomes atter, and hence that total tra¢ c falls (even though the
market share stays constant).
However, with marginal cost pricing, qA = cx, the last term in (29) is zero. Hence with
marginal cost pricing, the left-hand side of (29) is strictly positive as long as  < 1. The
next proposition is thus immediate
Proposition 5 The rms set the communication price qk, k = A;B above marginal cost.
Thus, the communication price exceeds the price level that induces a static rst best level of
tra¢ c represented by marginal cost pricing (provided that  < 1).
The nding contrasts the standard result that two-part tari¤ induces marginal cost pric-
ing on usage and therefore e¢ cient usage in the standard model without local network
externalities (Farrel and Saloner 1992). Local externalities create agent heterogeneity, and
since marginal customers on average have lower usage than inframarginal customers tra¢ c
price can be used as a rent extraction device. The rm thus trades o¤ e¢ ciency and rent
extraction for the inframarginal ("high-type") agents.
The network owner prices internal tra¢ c as if he had some degree of market power, where
the degree of market power is captured by the relative deviation between the marginal and
the average intensity of exchange. With global network externalities, symmetry between
agents prevails (hence  = 1), which means that the network adopts marginal cost pricing.
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Note that  decreases as the spread of g decreases, and approach 1=2 when the support of g
converges to zero.
It can be shown that the result does not depend on our limitation of the contract space to
two-part tari¤s. With an optimal general contract, increasing the usage price for marginal
agents relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of the inframarginal consumers, and
hence enables the rm to extract more rents from the latter. Finally, the e¤ect is weakened
by the negative e¤ect that increased usage price has on the composition of the network. As
long as the network has a positive margin on usage, the resulting reduction in tra¢ c is costly
for the network.
Dene the constrained e¢ cient usage price as the usage price that maximizes net welfare
given that agents are distributed according to individual optimization (i.e., the price that
emerges if a planner could set the usage price but make no other decisions). Then the
following holds:
Lemma 4 The constrained e¢ cient usage price is below marginal cost
The lemma follows directly from proposition 4. There are no externalities related to
communication intensity (since only the payer gets utility from communication). It is trivial
to show that H(z), the socially optimal distribution function H (for given v) solves (27)
with t=2 substituted in for t. Hence the socially optimal distribution H is steeper than the
equilibrium distribution function He.
As we have seen, a higher usage price hurts the marginal agents with many friends in the
network (z low) more than those with a few friends in their network (z high):The H function
thus decreases for values of z above 1=2 (with many friends) and decreases for z > 1=2 (with
few friends in the network). It follows that by subsidizing usage, the planner can make the
distribution function steeper and thus closer to the socially optimal distribution.
The market solution for usage pricing thus distorts the distribution of He by making it
atter, and this leads to a distribution of agents on the networks that are even further away
from the optimal distribution.
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6.2 Compatibility
We will now discuss the rms incentives to undertake investments in order to make the
networks compatible. We focus on the situation with one-way compatibility. Thus, network
A may give its members (improved) access to network B by undertaking an investment. Let
A  1 denote the degree at which the agents in network A can utilize network B, and write
the cost of compatibility as C(A). We only include connection pricing (no two-part tari¤s).
The degree of compatibility is set independently and simultaneously by the two rms at
stage 1, together with prices pA and pB. In other respects the timing is unchanged.
We assume that compatibility from the A network to the B network only benets the
consumers in the A network (consistent with the assumption above that only the caller
receives utility). The utilities of an agent (yi; zi) in network A and and B, respectively, are
given by
uA(yi; zi) =   tyi + gA(zi) + AgB(zi)  pA
uB(yi; zi) =   t(1  yi) + gB(zi) + BgA(zi)  pB
By reasoning exactly as when deriving (14), it follows that for given prices, the distribu-
tion H(z) is dened by the xed point to the mapping  C dened as
 CH(zi) = max

min

1  A + B
2
Z
g(d(z; zi))H(z)dz +
pB   pA   (1  A)g + t
2
; 1

; 0

Network As net prot equals
A = pA
Z
H(z)dz   C(A)
In the appendix we show that the rms will choose a degree of compatibility such that
the marginal customersvaluation of compatibility equals marginal costs. Recall from the
last section that the marginal customers on average have half of their friends in the other
network. First order conditions for A is thus
C 0(A) =
g
2
(30)
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The socially e¢ cient degree of compatibility (contingent on equal market shares), by
contrast, maximizes welfare W dened by (23) less the costs CA(A) + CB(B), and where
VA now reads
VA =
Z
[gA(zi) + AgB(zi)]H(zi)dzdzi
VB =
Z
[gB(zi) + BgA(zi)]H(zi)dzdzi
Maximizing W w.r.t. A at H = H (the socially optimal distribution) gives the rst order
condition
C 0A(A) =
Z
gB(zi)H
(zi)dzi (31)
The right-hand side of (31) is the total number of "friends" that the members of network A
have in network B. Since the measure of agents in network B is 1 (due to symmetry) this
is also the average number of friends members of network A has in network B. This is less
than g=2 - the density of customers in network A is larger on the northern than the southern
hemisphere, while the opposite is true in the B network.
Proposition 6 The rms have too strong incentives to make the networks (one-way) com-
patible.
The result emerges despite the fact that there are no externalities associated with com-
patibility in itself, as compatibility is one-way. With local network externalities, the marginal
agents value compatibility higher than the average agents, since the marginal agents commu-
nicate more with the agents in the other network than does the average agent. Since rms
compete for the marginal agents, it is his/her preferences that governs the choice of com-
patibility. Hence too much resources are spent on making the systems compatible compared
with the socially optimal level.9
9Farrel and Saloner (1992) nd in a model with global network externalities that rms chose an optimal
level of compatibility. Our result show that their result is not robust when allowing for local network
externalities.
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The comparison above is between the compatibility in the market solution and rst
best compatibility. If we instead use the constrained e¢ cient compatibility level as the
benchmark, this will actually strengthen our results. First, note that if the planner takes
the equilibrium distribution He as given, equation (31) with H substituted out with He
denes the contingent optimal compatibility level. Since He is atter than H, the right-
hand side of equation (31) then decreases, and the constrained e¢ cient value of A becomes
even lower (and thus further away from the equilibrium level).
Second, consider the constrained e¢ cient compatibility level when we take into account
that the compatibility level inuences the equilibrium distribution He(z), in an analogous
way to usage prices. Increasing A has a negative e¤ect on composition e¢ ciency, since it
attracts agents that communicate intensively with the other network (that is types zi > 0:5)
and punish agents with most of their friends in the A-network (types zi < 0:5). Hence, a high
level of compatibility makes the equilibrium distribution He(z) atter. However, we have
already seen that the e¢ cient distribution H(e) is steeper than the equilibrium distribution
He. Hence, in the constrained e¢ cient solution (where the planner could set the level of
compatibility but nothing else), the planner would reduce compatibility further in order to
obtain a more e¢ cient composition of consumers on networks.
7 Concluding remarks
Network externalities are important in a several markets, particularly related to ICT. In the
economics literature, the focus has been on global network externalities, where the network
e¤ects are related solely to size. In the present paper we argue that the network e¤ects not
only work through the size of the customer base, but also through its composition, i.e., the
attributes of the customers in the customer base and in particular their exogenously given
relationships to each other. We refer to this as local network externalities.
We propose a way of modeling local network externalities, which is su¢ ciently rich to
capture the main attributes of network composition and still su¢ ciently simple to make the
analysis tractable, and which embodies global externalities as a special case. We do this by
using a two-dimensional spatial model. Consumers have a location in a social space, and
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interact mostly with people located closely to them in this space. In addition, consumers
technological preferences are represented by a location in technological space. Finally, the
consumerslocation in the two spaces may be correlated in the sense that if two agents are
close in the social space they are also likely to be close in the technological space.
Two rms that are horizontally di¤erentiated in technology compete for customers. We
show that as long as social preferences are not too strong relative to technological preferences,
the model has a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium has several interesting properties.
First, the well known result that network externalities sti¤en competition may not hold
when network externalities are local. Second, the allocation of consumers on networks is
not e¢ cient, as there is a social externality associated with the choice of network that the
customers do not take into account when choosing between networks. Third, local network
externalities create a di¤erence between average and marginal consumers, and this lead to
ine¢ ciently high usage prices and too high levels of (one-way) compatibility.
8 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
We apply Blackwells su¢ cient condition10. It follows from Blackwells su¢ cient condition
that   is a contraction and thus has a unique xed-point if it satises i) a monotonicity
condition, and ii) discounting. Denote by S the set of all bounded continuous functions on
[ 1; 1]. Then   is a mapping from S into S. It is bounded above by 1 and below by 0, and
continuous as H(z) is continuous. The monotonicity condition requires that if Hi; HjS and
Hi(z)  Hj(z) all z, then  Hi(z)   Hj(z) for all z. Since the RHS of (14) is increasing
in H(z) for all z; the monotonicity condition is satised. Consider next the discounting
condition. The discounting condition requires that there exists some  in (0; 1) such that
for all Hi in S, all v  0, and all zi we have  (Hi + v)(zi)   (Hi)(zi) + v. It follows from
10See e.g. Sydsæter, Strøm and Berck (2005) or Stokey and Lucas (1989).
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(14) that
 (Hi + v)(zi) = max
"
min
"R
g(d(z; zi))(Hi(z) + v)dz +
pB pA g+t
2
  ajzij
t(1  a) ; 1
#
; 0
#
= max
"
min
"R
g(d(z; zi))Hi(z)dz +
pB pA g+t
2
  ajzij
t(1  a) + v
g
t(1  a) ; 1
#
; 0
#
Hence, if neither the requirement that H  1 (the minimum operator) or the requirement
that H  0 (the max operator) binds, it follows that  (Hi + v)(zi) =  (Hi)(zi) + v gt(1 a) . If
either the minimum operator or the maximum operator strictly binds, then  (Hi+a)(zi) <
 (Hi)(zi) + v
g
t(1 a) . It follows that   is a contraction mapping with modulus
g
t(1 a) .
Proof of Lemma 1
i) Suppose the equilibrium is not symmetric around 0. Then there exists a strictly positive
number z0 such that H(z0) 6= H( z0). But since the model is symmetric, there must exists
another equilibrium distribution H 0 dened as H 0(z0) = H( z0) and H 0( z0) = H(z0). Since
the equilibrium is unique we have thus derived a contradiction. The claim that if pA = pB
then H(zi) = 1 H(1  zi) for all zi[0; 1] can be proved by exactly the same argument
ii) Suppose H(z) is strictly increasing in z at an interval in [0; 1]. It follows that H(z)
has a local maximum for some z 6= 0 on this interval. Dene z0 as the highest value of z
less than z such that H(z0) = H(z). If z is also a global maximum, then z0 =  z. Now
dene a new distribution function eH(z) such that eH(z) = H(z) on [z0; z] and eH(z) = H(z)
otherwise. Since, by construction, eH(z)  H(z) for all z and strictly greater on the interval
(z0; z) it follows that   eH(z)  eH(z), with strict inequality on [z0; z]. Since H() is a
contraction there exists a x point H2(z) = lim
T!1
 T eH(z)  eH(z), which is a contradiction
due to uniqueness.
Finally, suppose H is decreasing but not strictly, and constant at some interval [z1; z2],
and strictly decreasing otherwise. This cannot be an equilibrium either. The agent localized
at z1 obtains stronger network e¤ects than one localized at z2, hence ym(z1) > ym(z2). From
equation (12) it then follows that  H(z1) >  H(z2), and H cannot be a xed point
iii) From (14) it follows that  , and thus the xed-point H, depends on the di¤erence
pB   pA. Let H(z) denote the initial equilibrium, and consider an increase in pB   pA. It
follows that  H  H, with strict inequality for all z where 1 > H(z) > 0. The result
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thus follows from monotonicity, see proof Proposition 1.
iv) We rst prove the following lemma
Lemma 5 Assume that the distribution H0(z) satises H(z) = 1 H(1 z) for 0  z  1=2.
Suppose further that H0(z)   H0(z) for all jzj < 1=2 with strict inequality for some z. Then
H0(z)   H0(z) <  T 1H0(z) <  TH0(z) < He(z) and  1H0(z) = He(z): For jzj > 1=2the
inequalities are reversed.
First note that it follows from (14) that ifH(z) = 1 H(1 z) then  H(z) = 1  H(1 z).
Hence this symmetry property is preserved. Furthermore, since by assumption  H0(z) 
H0(z) at the interval z( 12 ; 12), it follows from (14) that  2H0(z) >  H0(z) for all z in the
interval and vice versa on the complimentary interval. This holds for each step  T . Since the
mapping is bounded, it must converge, and since the equilibrium is unique it must converge
to the equilibrium distribution. QED
Let He0(z) denote the initial equilibrium, and consider an increase in g, a decrease in t or
an increase in a. Then it follows from (14) that  H0(z) > H0(z) for all jzj < 1=2 and vice
versa for jzj > 1=2, hence lemma 5 applies. Property iv) thus follows.
Proof of lemma 2
Suppose dHe(z)=dpA is independent of z. In the open equilibrium, the denition of  
given by (14) reads
 H0(zi) =
R
g(d(z; zi))H0(z)dz +
pB pA g+t
2
  tajzij
t(1  a)
Di¤erentiating both sides of the xed-point equation  He(z) = He(z) with respect to dpA,
assuming that dHe(z) = dHe independent of z thus gives that for any zi,
He(zi) =
gdHe(zi)  dpA=2
t(1  a)d
or
dHe(zi)
dpA
=  1
2
 1
t(1  a)  g
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independent of zi. By construction, He + dH is thus an equilibrium distribution, and as
the equilibrium distribution is unique it is also the only one. As the social circle has a
circumference of 2, dNA = 2dH, and this gives (19).
Proof of lemma 3
a and b) Dene the function Hp(zi)  H0(zi   ) for zi  z1   z02 , and Hp(zi) =
H0(zi + ) for zi   z1 + z02 and analogously around the south pole. The two denitions
are consistent even if z1   z0    < 0, since H0(z) = 1 on [ z1; z1] and z1  z0=2 + =2 by
assumption.
Denote by  p the mapping dened by (14) given the price di¤erence p = pB   pA.
We want to show that Hp  H0(z   ) solves Hp =  pHp(z), or equivalently that
 pHp(z) =  0H0(z   ). From (14) (recall that g(z0) = 0),
 pHp(zi) = max
"
min
"R zi+z0
zi z0 g(d(z; zi))H
p(z)dz + p g+t
2
  tazi
t(1  a) ; 1
#
; 0
#
Suppose zi  z1. Inserting Hp(z)  H0(z   ) and  = p2tagives
 pHp(zi) = max
"
min
"R zi+z0
zi z0 g(d(z; zi))H
0(z   )dz + g+t
2
  ta(zi   )
t(1  a) ; 1
#
; 0
#
or
 pHp(zi) = max
"
min
"R zi+z0 
zi z0  g(d(z; zi   ))H0(z)dz +
g+t
2
  ta(zi   )
t(1  a) ; 1
#
; 0
#
= H0(zi   ) (32)
where the last equality follows by denition. Note that at z1, H(z1 ) = 1. For 0 < zi < z1,
it follows that Hp(zi)  Hp(z1) = 1, and thus that Hp(zi) = 1 = H0(zi   ). The same
argument holds for z < 0 and around the south pole. The result thus follows.
c) The number of customers for supplier A can be written as
N(p) = 2
264 z1 
p
2taZ
0
1dz +
1 z1+p2taZ
z1 p2ta
H(z   p
2ta
)dz +
1Z
1 z1+p2ta
0dz
375
= 2
264 z1 
p
2taZ
0
1dz +
1 z1Z
z1
H(z)dz +
1Z
1 z1+p2ta
0dz
375
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Di¤erentiating with respect to p yields
N 0(0) =   1
ta
as stated.
Proofs regarding e¢ ciency
Maximizing and minimizing social value.
With two symmetric networks this is equivalent to maximizing VA with respect to the
distribution H(z) subject to
R
H(z)dz = 1, that is
max
H(zi)
ZZ
g(zi   z)H(z)H(zi)dzdzi s.t.
Z
H(zi)dzi = 1
with the associated Lagrangian
L =
Z Z
g(zi   z)H(z)dz   

H(zi)dzi
Point-wise maximization yields the rst order conditionZ
g(zi   z)H(z)dz    > 0! H(zi) = 1Z
g(zi   z)H(z)dz    < 0! H(zi) = 0Z
g(zi   z)H(z)dz    = 0! H(zi) undetermined
Obviously there are two solutions satisfying the rst order conditions, either H(z) = 0:5
all z, or H(z) = 1 for all z[z0; (1   z0)] where z0 is arbitrary, and H(z) = 0 otherwise.11
The two solutions are referred to as the maximum and minimum solutions respectively.
First order conditions with interior solution
We maximize (23) point-wise with respect to H(zi). When doing so, we have to take
into account that an increase in H(zi) inuences gA(zj) for all zj, and likewise for gB(zj).
More specically, a one unit increase in H on an interval z around zi increases social value
for an agent at zj if joining the network by g(d(zi; zj))z units. The aggregate e¤ect is thus
11Observe from the rst order conditions that the number of friends in the A network,
Z
g(zi  z)H(z)dz,
must be equal for all zi at which H(zi) is strictly between 0 and 1. Then it follows trivially that H can be
interior on an interval only if H = 0:5 everywhere.
33
R
g(d(zi; zj)dzdzj = gA(zi)dz. This comes in addition to the direct e¤ect of increasing H in
(23). The derivative of the integrand in (23) with respect to H(zi) is thus
2gA(zi)  2gB(zi)  t(1  2ym(zi))
= 4gA(zi)  2g + t  2t[ajzij+ (1  a)H(zi)] (33)
where we have used that gA(zi) + gB(zi) = g. With an interior solution for H, this
derivative is zero, in which case (33) reads
H(zi) =
R
g(d(z; zi))H
(z)dz +
t
2
 g
2
  t
2
ajzij
t
2
(1  a)
as stated in the text.
Two part tari¤ - rst order conditions
In any equilibrium, the combination of pi and qi maximizes the prot of rm i given
its market share (Armstrong and Vickers 2001). In a symmetric equilibrium, consider an
increase in qA combined with a decrease in pA such that  pA + v(qA)g=2 is constant. It is
trivial to show that the new distribution function eH will satisfy eH(1=2) = 1=2 and eH(jzj) =
1   eH(1   z). Hence the market share of rm A stays constant. A scale neutral change in
pA; qA thus requires
dpA
dqA
=
v0(qA)g
2
=
 x(qA)g
2
(34)
Maximizing (28) with respect to qA subject to (34) yields the rst order condition
 NAx(qA)g
2
+ [x(qA) + x
0(qA)(qA   c)]GA
+x(qA)(qA   c)@GA
dqA
= 0
or (since NA = 1 in the symmetric equilibrium)
[1  ]x(qA) + (qA   cx)x0(qA) + x(qA)(qA   cx)elqGA
qA
= 0
where  := 1
2
g=GA and elq is the elasticity operator.
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Consider a person located at zi:The derivative of uA and uB given by (25) and (26) wrt
qA given (34) gives
duA(zi)
dqA
=  x(qA)(gA   g=2)
Since gA is decreasing in z it follows that an increase in z makes H less steep, and as a result
GA decreases. Hence elqGA < 0.
Compatibility - rst order conditions
We reason in exactly the same way as when deriving rst order conditions with two-part
tari¤s. Firm A chooses a combination of compatibility and prices pA that maximizes prot
for a given market share, i.e., solves (assuming symmetry)
max
A;pA
pA   C(A) s.t.   pA + Ag=2
with rst order condition (assuming interior solution)
C 0(A) = g=2
as stated in the text.
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